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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is granted in
accordance with the provisions of Section 78A-3a-102(3)(j),
Utah Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This

appeal

(and

the predicate

factual

situation

surrounding it) presents the following issues for review:
1.

That the COUNTY had no costs (namely, expenses

for capital

improvements

for State Road

171)

mandates judgment in favor of the Plaintiff B.A.M.
DEVELOPMENT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's conclusions of
law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness.
United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885
1

(Utah Supreme

Court 1993) . This standard of review has also been
referred to as a "correction of error standard".
Jacobsen

Investment

Company

vs

State

Tax

Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court
1992).

"Correction

of

error"

means

that

no

particular deference is given to the trial court's
ruling on questions of law. State vs Pena, 869
P.2d

932, 936

(Utah Supreme Court 1994).

The

"correction of error" standard means that the
appellate court decides the matter for itself and
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of law. Howell vs Howell, 8 06 P.2d
1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993).
Presented

to trial court: Plaintiff's

CLOSING

ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822839.
2.

Exactions pursuant to the highway-abutting

Ordinance are unconstitutional.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See above. BAM III, Dolan.
Presented

to trial court: Plaintiff's

CLOSING

ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822839.
3.

The trial court erred in its disregard of

"Just Compensation Clause" principles, per Nollan
(USSCt

1987),

Dolan

(USSCt
2

1994),

Banberry

Development

(Utah

"constitutional

Supreme

standard

Court

1981:

of reasonableness"),

B.A.M. Development III (2008) and related cases
under

state

provisions,

and
and

national

the

constitutional

application

of

those

principles ["rough equivalence" of "costs to the
County" and exactions must consider "taxes paid"]
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See Subparagraph 1, above.
Presented

to trial court: Plaintiff's CLOSING

ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822839.
5.

The trial court erred in its misconstruing and

misapplying

Plaintiff's

claim

compensation,

for

"inverse
as

condemnation"

per

the

filed

pleadings, regardless of the "appeal" to the Salt
Lake County Board of Commissioners which refused
to even hear the appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See Subparagraph 1, above.
Presented

to trial court: Plaintiff's CLOSING

ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822839.

6.

The trial court committed prejudicial error in

refusing to receive and consider "rebuttal expert
witness" testimony from B.A.M.'s "expert" ["burden
of proof" under Dolan]
3

Presented

to

trial

court: TRANSCRIPT

OF

BENCH

TRIAL, 27 May 2010. Page 216, Lines 14-17.
7.

Appellant's

"notice

of

appeal"

was

filed

timely within the "extended" time-period, per the
post-trial motions not finally resolved by the
trial court. [Reserved, from "summary disposition"
motion filed by Appellee COUNTY.]
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
FIFTH AMENDMENT TO UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
. private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEEN AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; . . . not deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
UTAH IMPACT FEES ACT
[Section 11-36-102, Utah Code: "Definitions"]
(13) (a) "Roadway facilities" means streets or
roads that have been designated on an officially
adopted subdivision plat, roadway plan, or general
plan of a political subdivision, together with all
necessary appurtenances.
(b) "Roadway facilities" includes associated
improvements to federal and state roadways only
4

when the associated improvements:
(i)
are
necessitated
by
the
new
development; and
(ii) are not funded by the state or
federal government•
(c) "Roadway facilities" does not mean federal or
state roadways.
[INTERPRETATION/APPLICATION/SIGNIFICANCE TO CASE:
Local governments are allowed to have a "road
impact fee"
which the COUNTY does not
but the
"road impact fee" may not be based upon nor fund
improvements to federal or state roadways.]
STATE TRANSPORTATION CODE
[Section 72-4-123(1), Utah Code]
72-4-123 State highways
SR 178, SR-180.

SR-171 to SR-174,

State highways include:
(1) SR-171. From Route 111 at Eightyfourth West Street and Thirty-fifth South
Street easterly on Thirty-fifth South
Street and Thirty-third South Street to
Route 215 at the east-side of belt route.
Emphasis added.
HIGHWAY ABUTTING ORDINANCE
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.20,
no building or structure shall be erected,
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged,
and no building permit shall be issued therefor,
on any lot or parcel which abuts a major or
secondary highway, as shown on the map entitled,
"Official Major and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt
Lake County," on file with the development
services division and made part of this chapter by
reference, or other public street with does not
conform to current county width standards, unless
the portion of such lot or parcel within the
right-of-way of the highway to be widened or
additional
required
street
width
has
been
dedicated
to the county and improved.
The
dedication and improvements shall meet
the
standards for such highway or street as provided
5

in Section 15.28.060. [Ord 961 § 1 (part), 1986:
prior code § 2-6-1]
EXHIBIT 8 [2001 BENCH TRIAL, April 2001]. Emphasis
added. [ATTACHMENT #1 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an "inverse condemnation" case, filed pursuant
to the "self-executing" provisions of the Utah Constitution
[Article

I,

Section

unconstitutionally

22], to

"excessive"

recover

monies

development

for

the

"exact ions"

imposed by Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY pursuant to the
"highway-abutting Ordinance". [This case is not a "land-use
appeal"

(such as

from

a

legislative

action

involving

rezoning of real estate or the denial of a land-use by a
local government).]
State Road 171 is a state highway. Section 72-4-123 (1) ,
Utah Code. Utah Department of Transportation

[UDOT] is

responsible that State Roadway..
In 1998 the Plaintiff B.A.M. owned a 15-acre parcel,
the northern boundary of which extended "to the centerline
of

the

roadway"

(namely,

State

Road

171), of

which

approximately 17 feet thereof was paved with asphalt and
used for vehicular traffic purposes.
In 1998 SALT LAKE COUNTY required
"highway-abutting

Ordinance"

development approval

and

as

pursuant to its
a

condition

of

the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT to

dedicate and improve the entire 53-foot "half-width" of
6

State Road 171 immediately adjacent to and at the northern
boundary of its 15-acre "Westridge Meadows subdivision",
consisting ultimately of 44 "building lots" for singlefamily residential dwellings.
Following the rejection by the governing body of the
COUNTY

of

the

developer's

request

to

"appeal"

the

administrative requirement (per the Ordinance) to dedicate
and improve the State Road 171 right-of-way, the developer
filed this action in August 1998 to challenge the dedication
and improvement requirement.
In August 1999

one year after the litigation was

filed and with that litigation in play

the COUNTY finally

approved the development of the 44-lot subdivision and
required the previously-decided exactions. The 1999 "value"
of the dedication

Plaintiff owned the real estate "to the

centerline" of the existing roadway

and the improvements

was $391,000+ (1999 values). [Of that amount, approximately
$88,000

were

for

roadway

and

related

improvements

(underground stormsewer line upsizing and relocation, and so
forth), unrelated to any impact actually created by B.A.M.'s
project, but nevertheless required by the COUNTY.]
In October

2008,

following

the

third

substantive

"appeal" to the Utah appellate courts, the Utah Supreme
Court rendered its decision
Ill" decision

the herein-designated "B.A.M.

remanding the case back to the District
7

Court for correct application of the "rough equivalence"
standard under Dolan.
In May 2010 the District Court held a three-day bench
trial,

ultimately

dismissing

ruling

Plaintiff's

in

favor

claims.

of

the

Following

COUNTY

the

and

District

Court's denial of timely-filed post-trial motions (for new
trial and to enter additional "findings"), this appeal was
filed.
The Utah Supreme Court has retained jurisdiction of the
appeal.
This case has been the subject of three former appeals.
"BAM Development I": 2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710
(Utah App 2004)
"BAM Development II": 2006 UT 2, 128 P.3d 1161
(Utah 2006) .
"BAM Development III": 2008 UT 74, 196 P. 3d 601
(Utah 2008) .
SUMMARIES OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
The arguments of Appellant B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT are

summarized as follows:
1.

The

fact

that

the COUNTY has no "costs"

(capital improvements expenses) associated with
the State Road 171 roadway mandates judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, in
accordance with B.A.M. III.
2.

The COUNTY-required exactions (dedication and
8

installation of improvements) pursuant

to the

"highway-abutting Ordinance" are unconstitutional
in their application

(i.e. the exactions are

required of only "highway-abutting" parcels, while
development of similarly-situated parcels creating
the same "impact" are exempt from such exaction) .
3.

The trial court erred in failing to consider

and follow the provisions of Banberry Development
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 8 99
(Utah

Supreme

Court

1981)

["constitutional

standard of reasonableness" predicated upon 7element

test:

"taxation"

sources

must

be

considered for exactions] in its effect upon the
in-kind "exactions".
4.

The trial court erred in considering only a

portion of Plaintiff's Dolan
"excessive")

(constitutionally

claims, as framed by Plaintiff's

pleadings actually filed before the subdivision
development was approved.FOOTNOTE1
5.

The trial court erred in refusing to receive

the offered testimony of the Plaintiff's "expert
rebuttal

witness",

in

contradiction

to

the

procedural and burden of proof mandates of Dolan.

x

Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309
(USSCt 1994), hereinafter "Dolan".
9

6.

The

Appellant's

timely-filed

post-trial

motions extended the time for filing the "notice
of appeal", in accordance with long-established
and

widely-accepted

provisions

of

the Rules,

reasonably relied upon by counsel. [ISSUE RESERVED
FROM APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION,
December 2010]
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff preliminarily

notes that almost the

entirety of the Defendant's "defense" at this stage is
unalterably tied to and predicated upon the COUNTY'S novel,
creative

but

nevertheless

incorrect

"extension"

and

interpretation of the Supreme Court's "cost to the County"
language within B.A.M. Ill: that is, that the Supreme Court
intended that the phrase "cost to the County" really had a
more expansive meaning and application, namely, a "cost to
the government". If the Supreme Court rejects that creative
argument, the COUNTY essentially loses, as the COUNTY
an entity, as a "party"

as

had no "costs".

Even if the expanded "costs to the governments" is now
allowed, the COUNTY still fails to prevail because within
the May 2010 bench trial

the requested opportunity for the

COUNTY to present and prove its "costs to the County"
claims

the

COUNTY

still

failed

in

its

Dolan-based

obligations to establish the legitimacy of the exactions,
10

particularly in light of the "taxation resources" issue
(under Banberry), which must be part of the case if "costs
to UDOT" are to be a factor in the case, actually tried,
argued and ruled upon in the manner the COUNTY wanted.
The

"expansive"

governments"),

if

interpretation

granted

by

the

("costs
Supreme

to

the

Court,

is

nevertheless fatally flawed, by reason of the discriminatory
effect

imposed

upon properties

(and drivers)

who are

"highway-abutting" but have already, through fuel taxes and
other taxes, paid for their impact, while others are exempt
therefrom. [In case the Supreme Court is inclined to accept
the COUNTY'S "costs to the governments" interpretative "rewrite" of B.A.M. Ill (of which the Court's clear "cost to
the County" directive was relied upon), fairness would
demand the case be remanded back to the District Court, for
re-trial on the newly "re-written" standard.]
The COUNTY'S opportunity to quibble with
what the COUNTY herein seeks to do
"mandate" contained in B.A.M.

essentially

the Supreme Court's

Ill was in 2008 in its

"petition for rehearing", to delete "Footnote #5" (which the
COUNTY found offensive) . The COUNTY failed to then (in 2008)
to request the text or substantive changes to B.A.M. Ill;
the COUNTY should not now be heard to argue for such
"expansive" change.

11

I
THAT THE COUNTY HAS "NO COSTS"
MANDATES JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR
After more than ten years of litigation

(including

three substantive opinions of the appellate courts), the
Utah Supreme Court
Court

remanding the case back to the District

in B.A.M. Development III was absolutely clear as to

what the District Court was to do. Those directives
procedurally and substantively

are contained within the

closing paragraphs [12 and 13] and leave little room for
doubt or interpretation as what the Supreme Court had
developed and decided for the proper application of the
Dolan "rough equivalence" standard, the Utah Supreme Court
was precisely clear. The Court wrote:
1|l2 After determining the cost to each party, the
final step of the extent component of the Dolan
analysis is simple: The trial court must determine
whether the costs to each party are roughly
equivalent. FOOTNOTE OMITTED. Because each factor
is measured the same way, in dollars, this
calculation should be very simple. If the two sums
are about the same, they are roughly equivalent.
H 13
With this framework in mind, applying the
Dolan
analysis
becomes
a
relatively
straightforward task. First, the trial court must:
determine whether the exaction and impact are
related in nature
or whether the solution (the
exaction) directly addresses the specific problem
(the impact) . Second, the trial court must:
determine what the cost of dealing with the impact
would be to the County, absent any exaction; what
the costs would be to the developer; and whether
the two costs are roughly equivalent.
2008 UT 74 at HH 12-13. Emphasis added. Footnote in original
12

text has been omitted.
The May 2010 bench trial before Judge Toomey was,
theoretically, the premier opportunity for the COUNTY to
present its evidence and prove its claims on the "cost to
the County" issue directed by this Court in B.A.M. III.
Within

that

proceeding,

the

COUNTY

produced

NO

evidence:
*NO physical

evidence

(checks, invoices paid,

billings, contracts, ledgers or similar financial
records) were offered as "evidence" of any "costs
to the County" associated with any state roadway,
let alone State Road 171.
*NO hard evidence (interlocal agreements with UDOT
or the State itself) was identified or offered as
"evidence"

of

any

statutory,

"moral")

obligation
for

the

(contractual,
COUNTY

to

be

financially responsible for capital improvement
expenses for any state roadway, let alone State
Road 171.
*the COUNTY, given that "premier opportunity" in
which to present its case fully and completely
failed even to put forward knowledgeable persons
(for example, County auditors, County budgetary
personnel, County public works or road engineers,
or similar UDOT personnel) who would know about
13

such

such "costs to the County". The only witnesses the
COUNTY put forward were two "expert witnesses" who
actually

(and admittedly) knew nothing of the

"costs to the County" issue.
By the conclusion of the bench trial, the COUNTY had
not presented one scintilla of evidence of any "costs to the
County, absent the exaction" as B.A.M, III required. The
simple fact was true: the COUNTY had no such costs.
This "no costs" situation

which was always suspected

and even understood by the Plaintiff and its counsel

was

always the case, throughout the 12-year "history" of the
litigation.

"Hard

evidence"

(i.e.

answers

to

interrogatories, production of documents) of such "costs"
would have been required to have been produced

(by the

COUNTY), pursuant to "continuing" requests for pre-trial
"discovery", but no such "hard evidence" was ever provided.
[The COUNTY didn't produce

within "discovery" or at trial-

--"hard evidence" of such "costs", because there was no
"hard evidence" thereof, for the simple reason that there
were NO "costs".] Except for a single incident (18 December
2009) when the COUNTY'S counsel

attempting to avoid the

then-imminent granting of summary judgment

intentionally

misrepresented the "the County has costs" to the specific
inquiry of Judge Toomey

the COUNTY has never claimed to

have "costs" (i.e. actual expenses for capital improvements
14

to state highways).FOOTNOTE2
The COUNTY produced during the May 2 010 bench trial two
witnesses: Mr Dudley

and Mr Nepstad,

each

supposedly

qualified as an "expert". Mr Dudley, a developer, testified
generally that the COUNTY'S exactions were reasonable and
that B.A.M., like others, should expect to incur those
exactions. Mr Nepstad, quite literally the COUNTY'S "star
witness"

(because he was engaged to present the "costs"

evidence), was the County's concluding witness.
During his direct testimony, Mr Nepstad did not offer

Following Plaintiff's lengthy "oral argument" commentary on
the COUNTY'S lack of "costs" for the State roadway and for
which the COUNTY had filed a non-compliant response to the
"summary judgment" (i.e. no sworn testimony by "affidavit" in
opposition to Plaintiff's "sworn testimony" in affidavit that
the County had no costs; no "verbatim restatement" of the
Plaintiff's written "undisputed facts" in its supporting memo,
as required by Rule 7(c)(3), U.R.C.P.), the District Court
(Judge Toomey) "opened" the COUNTY'S responses to the "costs"
discussion:
COURT: Mr Christensen, is there a cost to the County?
Mr CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, there are costs to the
county.
TRANSCRIPT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORAL ARGUMENTS HEARING, 18
December 2009, page 15, lines 16-18. Emphasis added.
Moments later Mr Christensen was to remark:
Mr CHRISTENSEN: . . . Obviously we don't have a case
if we say the county has no cost. . . .
Transcript of summary judgment hearing, page 18, lines 23-24.
Emphasis added.
15

any evidence

testimonial or documentary

as to any actual

"costs" to the County as to financial responsibility for
State [UDOT] roadways. Mr Nepstad did engage in a lengthy
presentation, guided by the COUNTY'S counsel, as to the
"possibility"

conjectural and speculative for sure, and

being "political" in nature, arguably outside the realm of
his training and expertise

that UDOT may, at some future

time transfer "ownership" of State Road 171 to the COUNTY,
which would then, but only then, be financially responsible
for the capital improvements. TRANSCRIPT at Page 119, line
23 through Page 123, line 18.
That the COUNTY had NO "costs" was confirmed by his
testimony on cross-examination:
MR. HOMER: Mr. Nepstad, do you have any
in your
involvement with the county, do you have any
evidence today that Salt Lake County has in the
past, in other words, from 2010 backwards, has
incurred any costs that would go to this portion
of the state roadway?
MR. NEPSTAD: Not that I'm aware of.
MR. HOMER: Okay. Are you aware of any legal
obligation currently existing that would make Salt:
Lake County financially liable to incur costs for
that roadway in the future, for example an interlocal
agreement
contract
or
some
other
participatory contract? Are you aware of such a
contractual obligation?
MR. NEPSTAD: No.
MR. HOMER:
obligation?
MR. NEPSTAD:

Are

you

aware

No.
16

of

any

statutory

MR. HOMER:
Okay. Under the law, if UDOT is the
controlling jurisdiction, UDOT has the statutory
responsibility financially for the UDOT roads,
correct?
MR. NEPSTAD: I don't know that to be honest.
TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL, 27 May 2010, Page 177, Line 21
through Page 178, Line 14. Names (not shown in Transcript)
added for clarity.
That Mr Nepstad

the COUNTY'S "expert" witness

does

not "know" or have that information in his head or briefcase
is not, per se, the issue. The lack of evidence, however, is
critical because Mr Nepstad was, essentially, the COUNTY'S
only witness on this "financial" issue. Thus, the COUNTY
presented absolutely no evidence of any "costs" to it for
capital improvements to the State Road 171.
That the former "record" (including transcripts of the
former "Judge Hansen" bench trials of 2001 and 2006) was
arguably read by Judge Toomey is irrelevant: in the former
trials there was absolutely no "evidence" (or even claim, by
the COUNTY) as to any "costs" to the COUNTY (for the capital
improvements for State Road 171) .
The COUNTY has thus failed in its burden under Dolan
and B.A.M. ill.
Thus, the "bottom line" to any kind of "accounting" (or
similar "balance sheet" as to "costs"

in accordance with

the Utah Supreme Court's clear directives in B.A.M. Ill
must look something like this:
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"Costs" for State Road 171 capital improvements:
Costs to B.A.M. Development
Costs to Salt Lake County

$391,000.00
0.00

"Excessive" (unconstitutional) exaction
against B.A.M. Development
Logic

even common sense

$391,000.00

would dictate that with all

of this litigation (3 appeals to the Utah appellate courts,
with a fourth likely) and in the face of the clear directive
(e.g. "mandate" as the case law describes it) of the Utah
Supreme Court, the trial court would be most observant and
careful to honor, at least

in identification

(if not

application) the Supreme Court's "determine costs to the
County"

directive.

[One would

think

the

COUNTY would

theoretically want the same "finding".] The Court, although
requested to do so, didn't make such a "finding". The
District Court's "non-finding" (sic) on this most critical
issue is buried within the obscure text of FINDING OF FACT
# 16, thus:
16. The road-widening projects will likely be
financed by a combination of government road
construction funding sources, including federal
highway funds and additional State, County, and/or
municipal funds.
RECORD at Page 904. Emphasis added. That "Finding"

and it

is the only one, even close to being on point

falls

"woefully short" of what B.A.M. Ill legitimately expected
and requires. This is hardly the "unwavering fidelity to the
letter and spirit of the mandate" (trial court to determine
1 Q

"costs to the County, absent any exaction") our appellate
jurisprudence expects. See Campbell vs State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, 2004 UT 34, 1 5, 98 P. 3d 409.
Emphasis added.
The simple truth of the matter is: the County presented
no evidence of "costs to the County", because it had no
"costs to the County", whether so "found" or not.
Because the County has "no costs", the Utah Supreme
Court should direct the District Court to enter judgment for
the Plaintiff in the amount of the $391,000, plus accruing
interest thereto
rate

or

prejudgment interest at the statutory

prejudgment

interest

for

"eminent

domain"

proceedings, whichever is higher.
POINT II
THE COUNTY-REQUIRED "TAKINGS" EFFECTED PURSUANT TO
THE "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING ORDINANCE"
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Dolan the United States Supreme Court reiterated:
One of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness, should be borne by the public as a
whole."
114 SCt at 2316. Emphasis added.
The COUNTY'S legal position in defending the Countyrequired

"exactions" imposed upon the Plaintiff B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT

is

premised

entirely

upon

administrative

decisions enforcing the provisions of the County's "highway19

abutting Ordinance", which provides:
15.2 8.010 Dedication and improvement required.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.20,
no building or structure shall be erected,
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged,
and no building permit shall be issued therefor,
on any lot or parcel which abuts a major or
secondary highway, as shown on the map entitled,
"Official Major and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt
Lake County," on file with the development
services division and made part of this chapter by
reference, or other public street with does not
conform to current county width standards, unless
the portion of such lot or parcel within the
right-of-way of the highway to be widened or
additional
required street width has been
dedicated to the county and improved. The
dedication and improvements shall meet the
standards for such highway or street as provided
in Section 15.28.060. [Ord 961 § 1 (part), 1986:
prior code § 2-6-1]
EXHIBIT 8 [2001 BENCH TRIAL, April 2001]. Emphasis added.
[ATTACHMENT #1 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF]
Attention

should be given

to the

"title" of the

section: "Dedication and improvement required" . That says it
all. Both "dedication" and "improvement" are "required". The
"dedication" is to be effected to the COUNTY.
Attention given to the actual wording of the "highwayabutting Ordinance" does not improve the COUNTY'S position:
the operative textual provisions make the COUNTY'S position
actually worse. Those provisions are clear: the "highwayabutting" developer must, as a condition of development
approval, "dedicate" AND "improve" the adjoining roadway, to
its full width. Period. This is without regard for any
actual or even imputed "impact" of the proposed development.
9f>

Pursuant thereto, B.A.M.

which then owned real estate "to

the centerline of the existing roadway"

was required to

make dedications and improvements having a cost and value of
$391,000+ (1999 prices).
The

inequities and

facially-obvious

discriminatory

result arising from application of the "highway-abutting
Ordinance" are readily apparent

from a simple reading

thereof:
1.

The "exaction" (duty to dedicate property and

to improve the roadway) is imposed only against
"highway-abutting" parcels and their owners.
2.

Conversely, developers of parcels which are

not "highway-abutting" have no such obligation to
dedicate and install improvements.
The COUNTY cannot avoid the foregoing simplistic analysis of
its

"highway-abutting"

Ordinance; the Ordinance

is so

worded. Likewise, the COUNTY cannot deny, in this case, the
disparate, disproportionate and discriminatory result the
exaction
Ordinance

imposed

pursuant

to

the

highway-abutting

inflicted upon the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT.

The United States Supreme Court in Nollan vs California
Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 107 SCt 3141 (USSCt 1987),
noted:
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something
other than it was. The purpose then becomes, quite
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simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some
governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and
land use context, this is not one of them. In
short, unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid restriction of
land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion.
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. The COUNTY, requiring the
exactions ONLY from "highway-abutting" parcels while
simultaneously
approving
other
traffic-generating
developments
not
subject
to the exaction, cannot
successfully claim the exaction is necessary in lieu of an
actual ban. In quite literal terms, the "highway-abutting
Ordinance" is
facially
creating and constituting a
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of
the compensation requirement/ rather than the
stated police power objective."
107 SCt at 3151. Emphasis added. The Nollan Court continued:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to
be more than a pleading requirement/
and
compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination,, As indicated earlier,
our cases describe the condition for abridgement
of property rights through the police power as a
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the objective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is a heightened risk that the
purpose
is
avoidance
of
the
compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added.
It is readily seen that the "purpose" of the COUNTY'S
Ordinance (mandating the "dedication/improvement") of the
highway,

but

imposed

only

parcels, is simply,
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against

"highway-abutting"

11

. . . . the obtaining of an easement to serve
some governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation,
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. The "highway-abutting
Ordinance"

is

acknowledged
required

to

improvements
roadway

that

transparent.

practice
make

any

that

Coupled

adjacent

dedication

with

parcels
or

the

are not

undertake

any

the "purpose" is simply to obtain increased

improvements,

but

without

paying

for

those

improvements. Such is not a valid governmental purpose, and
Nollan and Dolan make that point clear.
In Nollan the United States Supreme Court observed a
factual setting which is exactly-on-point to this "dedicate
and improve" situation created and mandated by the "highwayabutting Ordinance". The Supreme Court wrote:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the
burden of California's attempt to remedy these
problems, although they had not contributed to it
more than other coastal landowners, the State's
actions, even if otherwise valid, might violate
either the incorporated Takings Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause.
107 SCt at 3148. Footnote 4. Emphasis added. Citation to
cases omitted.
Such is exactly the situation here: the COUNTY-required
"exactions" pursuant to the "highway-abutting Ordinance"
have "singled out" the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT (and
other similarly-situated "highway-abutting" developers) to
"bear the burden of [Salt Lake County's] attempt to remedy
these problems". Nollan, supra at 107 SC at 3148.
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At

this

juncture

there

are

two

significant

observations:
1.

The COUNTY has no "roads impact fee". Thus,

there is no actual mechanism in place for the
COUNTY to "capture" (undersigned's terminology)
monies from those developments, which are NOT
highway-abutting but which nevertheless "create"
a similarly-situated "impact" upon the roadways.
[This issue was the fundamental problem with the
COUNTY'S "costs" defense: the COUNTY (through its
witness, Mr Nepstad) could not then and cannot
even now explain and answer this simple question:
If B.A.M.'s relative share of the "costs"
(to the "governments") is, as Nepstad
states
(albeit
incorrectly),
"five
percent", from whence is the "other
ninety-five percent" of the monies
("cost") coming, if not from "taxation"
sources (fuel taxes, sales tax)? Why do
B.A.M.'s citizen-residents have to "pay
twice" (now AND later)?
2.
have

Even IF the COUNTY had
a

"roads

impact

which it does not

fee",

state

statute

expressly prohibits local governments (including
the COUNTY) from having any "roads impact fee"
which utilizes "state or federal roadways" as a
basis upon which to calculate or collect the
"impact fee". Section 11-36-102(13), Utah Code
(effective since 1995). If the COUNTY is thus
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statutorily-prohibited from even having such a fee
for such "other" drivers and their vehicles, why
is B.A.M. being singled out to provide and pay for
improvements other developments do not have?
These observations and arguments could also be raised
against UDOT, if the COUNTY'S expansive

"costs to the

governments" interpretation is accepted. UDOT

having no

realistic ability to regulate development (i.e. UDOT doesn't
issue

building

permits)

has

no

realistic

way

of

implementing a "roadway impact fee". Plaintiff B.A.M. would
argue that such a situation

including the legislative

recognition that fuel taxes and other taxes pay essentially
100% of UDOT's capital improvements budget

is the prime

reason for the statutory prohibition (against "road impact
fees" for state or federal highways) of Section 11-36102(13), Utah Code.
The exactions (dedications and improvements) required
of

the

"highway-abutting"

B.A.M.

required of similarly-situated

DEVELOPMENT

developments

but

not

(and their

residents, drivers and vehicles) raise patently-obvious
"equal protection" (under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment) and "uniform operation of laws" (under
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution) issues which
the COUNTY is powerless to deny or refute.
In

the

instant

case,
25

the

COUNTY'S

own

witnesses

acknowledged that the subdivisions which are not "highwayabutting" have no dedication and improvement requirement.
Similarly, the COUNTY has no mechanism for "capturing"
(undersigned's terminology) monies
impact fee) , to be utilized

(such as through an

for the payment of those

developments' impact.
The

COUNTY'S

argument

namely

that

the

"highway-

abutting Ordinance" is uniformly applied to all "highwayabutting" parcels

is hollow and illusory: the true and

invalid discriminatory effect of the Ordinance's hit-andmiss, geography-based criteria of application is readily
seen.
Ill
THE COUNTY-REQUIRED EXACTIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF THE CRITERIA
OF BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT VS SOUTH JORDAN CITY (1981)
Even if the COUNTY'S misguided

and incorrect

self-

serving interpretation and application (namely, "costs to
the governments") "expansion" (undersigned's terminology) of
B.A.M, Ill's Paragraph 13's clear directive to the trial
court

(determine "costs to the County") is erroneously

adopted and followed by the Supreme Court, the COUNTY'S
position is nevertheless fatally flawed. The so-called
"costs to the governments"

(in this case, UDOT, as the

governmental agency singularly responsible for the capital
improvements to state roadways, including State Road 171)
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are already covered and paid for by the "taxation" resources
of

UDOT

through

legislative

appropriations.

[Those

"taxation" resources include the motor fuels taxes, vehicle
registration

fees,

excise

taxes

upon

rubber

tires,

distributions of federal funds from the national government
(which themselves are "tax" revenues) , some sales taxes, and
so

forth.

Those

"taxes"

represent

and

constitute

an

intentional legislative policy and practice for an acrossthe-board, fair method of providing the funding source for
state roadways. Those taxes are imposed in a uniform manner
upon all citizens, based essentially upon usage. In that
context, everyone pays, as contrasted with the B.A.M.
situation wherein only "highway-abutting" persons pay
actually "double pay"

a second time because those persons

have already paid or will in the future pay those roadway
taxes to the State and the national government.]
In 1981 the Utah Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan
City, 631 P.2d

899

(Utah Supreme Court 1981), therein

developing the "constitutional standard of reasonableness"
for development exactions. In articulating the principle
(i.e. the residents should not be required to "pay twice"),
the Banberry court identified a 7-element test by which the
"reasonableness" of an exaction or impact fee might be
gauged. The Court wrote:
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Among the most important factors the municipality
should consider in determining the relative burden
already borne and yet to be borne by newly
developed properties and other properties are the
following,
suggested
by
the
well
reasoned
authorities cited below:
(1)
the
cost
facilities;

of

existing

capital

(2) the manner of financing existing
capital facilities (such as user charges,
special assessments, bonded indebtedness,
general taxes, or federal grants);
(3) the relative extent to which the
newly developed properties and the other
properties
in the municipality
have
already
contributed
to the cost
of
existing capital facilities
(by such
means
as
user
charges,
special
assessments, or payment from the proceeds
of general taxes);
(4) the relative extent to which the
newly developed properties and the other
properties
in the municipality
will
contribute
to the cost of
existing
capital facilities in the future;

631 P. 2d at 903-904. Emphasis added. Citation to supporting
cases omitted. Elements #5 thru #7, being inapplicable to
the present litigation, have been omitted.
Concerning

each

elements, the COUNTY
exactions

at

bar

of

the

four

foregoing

Banberry

whose burden it is to justify
through

evidence

(ala

Mr

the

Nepstad's

testimony) or even argument failed entirely to address them.
During the May 2010 bench trial NO evidence was ever adduced
as to Element #1 "the cost of existing capital facilities".
The

Court

will

readily

observed
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the

applicability

of

Elements # # 2 , 3 and 4: that taxes have been traditionally
utilized

to pay

for roads. No empirical

evidence was

presented on those Elements.
In the instant situation, State Road 171 is a state
highway. The capital improvements for that state highway
come from appropriations made by the Utah Legislature, from
revenue sources such as motor vehicle fuel and tires excise
taxes, sales taxes, driver license fees, federal grants and
revenue sharing, and other sources of state revenue. Under
the Banberry "reasonableness" criteria # # 1 , 2, 3, and 4,
the residents

(and/or future residents of the Westridge

Meadows subdivision [the B.A.M. project] HAVE ALREADY PAID
and/or WILL PAY IN THE FUTURE

through their Utah state

gasoline fuel, tire excise taxes, etc

their proportionate

amount of the capital costs associated with the State Road
171

(and

for other

roadways) .

[The Westridge

Meadows

residents didn't unexpectedly appear out of thin air; they
didn't arrive

by spaceship from extra-terrestrial space.

They were likely in Utah all the time. That they have
relocated their residences to the new development does not
change the simple fact that they have, in the past, paid for
the state highway improvements and they will, in the future,
continue to the pay for those capital improvements. These
"taxation"-based revenues implemented and contemplated by
the Utah Legislature represent an intentional and carefully29

designed financing scheme to finance the construction and
maintenance of state highways: those persons and entities
which create the actual "impact" upon the state highways
through their use thereof pay their proportionate share
thereof through the fuel and other excise taxes to the state
and

federal

governments,

drivers

license

and

vehicle

registration fees, sales taxes, and other statewide revenue
sources (not from COUNTY derived funding or sources3) . Thus,
one hundred percent [100%] of B.A.M.'s expenses in complying
with the COUNTY-required exaction should be reimbursed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution
expressly directs that the "taxation" and other charges
("proceeds from fees, taxes, and other charges related to
the operation of motor vehicles on public highways", as well
as the fuels tax) be utilized for

(b) the construction, maintenance, and repair of
State and local roads, including payment for
property taken for or damaged by rights-of-way .
Article XIII, Section 5.

3

To the extent that the COUNTY utilizes any of its monetary
resources for state highways
which is certainly disputed and
certainly has neither been claimed nor proved by the COUNTY
those monetary resources are similarly derived from taxation
sources from and against the citizens, even if derived from
transferred monies received from the state and national
governments.
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State statute [Section 11-36-102 (13) (c) , effective 1995
and thereafter] expressly prohibits local governments
this case the COUNTY

in

from including in its "impact fee"

derivations the impact upon federal or state highways.
Although the COUNTY does not have a "roads impact fee"
which arguably part of the B.A.M. problem, as only "highwayabutting"

persons

are

imposed

upon

by

the

COUNTY'S

Ordinance, while similarly-situated developments creating
the same roadway "impact" pay nothing

the principle is

sound: the Legislature recognizes that the fuels taxes and
other "taxation" sources collected by the State pay the
citizen's

full

share

of

the

State

Highway

capital

improvements expenses.
What is particularly troubling in the context of the
excessive exactions required of B.A.M. is the fact that Mr
Nepstad testified that those B.A.M.-installed improvements
are likely to be "ripped out" by UDOT when the State Road
171 is finally improved

by UDOT

to its full width. See

TRANSCRIPT. Page 161, Line 23. The "costs" therefor

that

is, for the re-installation of those improvements installed
by UDOT

will obviously come from "taxes" sources. Thus,

B.A.M. residents have been forced to "pay twice" and that's
not what Banberry says is to happen.

[From a strictly

"impact" analysis, the exaction has quite literally been
"wasted",

which

raises

serious
31

"takings"

questions:

government

ought

not

be

requiring

an

exaction

which

satisfies the need, only to have the improvement "ripped
out" and replaced with a tax-paid improvement.]
COUNTY

"expert

witness"

Mr

Nepstad

indicated

[TRANSCRIPT, 27 May 2010, Pages 171 through 174] that he
relied on the 1998-published

(by Wasatch Front Regional

Council) "Long Range Transportation Plan 1998-2020" for much
of his "expert" opinion. That document was admitted into
evidence. EXHIBIT P-123. Page 98 of that document (exhibit)
contains significant information, in the chart [Table VI-1] ,
for the 22-year period (1998-2020) :
[EXHIBIT P-123, page 98]
[ATTACHMENT #2 TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF]
STATEWIDE REVENUE
Federal funds
Federal Highway Trust Fund $ 3,900,000,000
Special Olympics funding
300,000,000
State funds
Highway User Revenues
$10,625,000,000
General Funds and bonding
1,900,000,000
Other funds
Innovative financing
62,500,000
Total Statewide Revenue

$16,787,500,000

In a "do the math" analysis of the "evidence" Mr Nepstad
conveniently overlooked) , it is evident that of the $16billion dollars of projected UDOT revenue for the 22-year
period [1998-2010], only 62.5-million is projected to come
from "innovative financing".

[Narrative text within the

document explains that "innovative financing" includes such
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things as the "express lane surcharges" and "developer
exactions".] Thus, mathematically, compared against the
total of the projected UDOT revenues for the 1998-2020 timeframe, the "developer exactions" (only a PART of the $62.5million) constitute but 0 . 372%

that's not "three percent",

but is rather "three-tenths of one percent"

of the total

projected UDOT revenues. The converse of that "mathematical"
statistic is overwhelming: 99.6% of the projected UDOT
revenues comes from "taxation" sources. Thus, whatever
UDOT's budgeted expenditures for "capital improvements" for
State Highways

including State Road 171, if and when that

roadway is ultimately improved, at the relevant location
might be, those revenues will come almost completely (i.e.
99.6%) from "taxation" sources, and Banberry is clearly
implicated, if not violated.FOOTNOTE4

The unrebutted testimony of Becky Bradshaw
UDOT Comptroller--is consistent. Ms Bradshaw testified that the UDOT "audited"
revenues for Fiscal Year 2009 were:
Sales taxes
$269-million
Federal tax transfers
322-million
State fuel taxes
337-million
Vehicle registration, license fees
77-million
Those
"taxation
sources"
(readily-recognized
and so
characterized, for Banberry purposes) total to an amount equal
to $1005 million ($1.005-billion). For the same period, Ms
Bradshaw testified the total UDOT revenues were $1,091billion. [TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL, 27 May 2010, Pages 194
through 196.] Arithmetically, the "taxation" revenues equal
more than 92% of the FY 2009 UDOT budget: generally consistent
with the WFRC-documented projections.
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The

"bottom

line"

although

an

"accounting"

term

widely-used in American vernacular and certainly applicable
in this "costs to the County" setting from B.A.M. Ill

is

this: the "lion's share" (almost 100%) of the UDOT revenues
come from

"taxation" sources.

[Intuitively, this would

almost have to be the case.] Correspondingly, almost 100% of
its expenditures for capital improvements would come from
those same "taxation" sources. Whatever "clearinghouse role"
the COUNTY advocates for itself

see COUNTY'S "petition for

rehearing" arguments preceding B^A.ML III

that role (that

the COUNTY must enforce exactions so that UDOT will have
right-of-way and improvements) is simply not supported by
the evidence; in fact, the evidence disproves the need for
that role.
The May 2 010 bench trial before Judge Toomey on remand
was the COUNTY'S opportunity to provide evidence to the
District Court on the "costs to the County". Instead, the
COUNTY present its "expert witness" Mr Jon Nepstad, quite
literally a "walk on" to the COUNTY'S defensive team. [Mr
Nepstad had read about the B.A.M,

III decision in the

newspaper and recommended his professional services, which
the COUNTY accepted.]
That the COUNTY had NO "costs", as established in Point
I, above, all of the testimony of Mr Nepstad concerning
"costs

to

the

government"

(ala
34

UDOT)

is

essentially

irrelevant. The Supreme Court in B.A.M. Ill said "costs to
the County, absent the exaction" and the entirety of Mr
Nepstad's

testimony

(concerning

"costs

to

UDOT")

is

irrelevant.
The

"fatal flaw"

in the Nepstad

"expert witness"

testimony is this: he presented not one iota, not a single
scintilla, not a single sliver of "hard evidence" (or even
"soft evidence" if there is such a thing) as to the COUNTY
actually having any "costs" for the State Road 171. None.
Not a single shred of evidence. All of his "testimony" as to
the capital improvements expenses for State Road 171 was in
what might be called "the passive voice" (of grammatical
English): that is, there would be "expenses incurred by
somebody"

(not a quote, per se, from Nepstad) in the

improvement of State Road 171, but that "somebody" was
certainly not identified to be the COUNTY.
Mr Nepstad's (and the COUNTY'S) failure to consider and
evaluate Banberry's #1 criterion ["the cost of existing
capital

facilities"]

is a fatal

flaw for all of its

analysis.
Similarly, Mr Nepstad's testimony (explaining his cost
projections: for example, $3.4-million to be paid for rightof-way acquisition, the great majority of which goes for
"total takings") confirms that "public funding" (that is,
taxpayer-derived funds: "taxes" in some form) will be used
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for those acquisitions. B.A.M.'s claims are valid.
IV
THE ENTIRETY OF THE COERCED EXACTION IS AT ISSUE
This case, as noted, is an "inverse condemnation",
filed pursuant to the "self-executing" provisions of the
Utah Constitution: it seeks monetary reimbursement for the
"excessive" exactions imposed upon the Plaintiff. B.A.M.'s
litigation claims

at trial and on appeal

has always been

consistent: that the exactions under the "highway-abutting
Ordinance"

were

unconstitutional

excessive.

See,

for

example, Plaintiff's Complaint:
15. The requirement of SALT LAKE COUNTY that a 53foot "half-width" roadway be dedicated and
improved, as a condition of development approval
of the "Westridge Meadows" development, without
the payment of just compensation therefor, is
arbitrary,
capricious,
without
empirical
justification
or
support,
excessive,
unconstitutional and in violation of law.
Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint, RECORD at Page 4.
The COUNTY has argued and the District Court has
essentially ruled that the scope of the award is limited to
the so-called "thirteen feet" (from the so-called "forty
feet" to the "fifty-three feet" dimensions) , as per whatever
might have been limited by previous trial court (Judge Tim
Hanson) and/or appellate court rulings, by reason of what
might

have

been

administrative bodies
theoretically

"appealed"

to/from

the

County's

is flawed and incorrect. Although

overridden by Judge Toomey's
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variety of reasons:
j7

*the highway abutting Ordinance specifies and
requires exaction of the full amount.
*the litigation situation is not merely that the
highway-abutting Ordinance theoretically requires
the full dedication, the COUNTY actually "took
it". Thus, the filed litigation.
*what B.A.M.'s
original plat and/or other
"paperwork" submitted as part of the application
process was simply what B.A.M. was told to do, by
COUNTY staff. The entire development approval
process would not have gotten off of Square 0 had
he come in with plat and papers at odds with what:
the administrative staff
charged with the
enforcement and implementation of the "highway abutting Ordinance
initially suggested.
*the COUNTY was given the opportunity to leave the
entire real estate in a "fallow" (undersigned's
terminology)
situation
(no
dedication,
no
improvements) put reserved for future UDOT
acquisition and payment. In April-May 1998 the
COUNTY expressly rejected this proposal by B.A.M.
[This concept is discussed at length in the
paragraph immediately following.]
*the "notice of claim" analysis is flawed. No
"notice of claim" is required as a prerequisite to
an "inverse condemnation" claim.
^following the litigation
one year after the
litigation had been filed in August 1998
in 1999
the COUNTY required the installation of the
"barrier fencing" along the northern boundary of
the subdivision, thus denying to those residents
(at least, to nine of them) "driveway access" onto
State Road 171. Thus, the "internal roadways" were
required, and the State Road 171 exactions were
entirely "excessive".
*the COUNTY itself felt that the Utah Court of
Appeals decision in "B.A.M. I" was incorrect. The
COUNTY itself sought to overturn "B.A.M. I" (on
the "core" Dolan question) and filed a crosspetition for certiorari review. The COUNTY ought
not be allowed to rely upon a ruling it has
challenged.
*the "certiorari" review by the Supreme Court was
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Any limiting effect arising from B.A.M.'s "appeal of
the administrative decision" (paraphrased) in June-July 1998
time-frame is flawed and misplaced, for at least four
reasons:
1.

The Plaintiff's "inverse condemnation" claims

of "unconstitutional taking" are under the state
and federal constitutions. The Utah Supreme Court
has

ruled

that

the

provisions

thereof

"inverse condemnation" proceedings

for

are "self -

executing". Colman vs State Land Board, 795 P.2d
622

(Utah Supreme Court

claim"

is required

requisite
County,

1990). No

as an administrative

to litigation. Hansen vs
794

P.2d

"notice of

838

[Utah

1990]

pre-

Salt

Lake

(it

would

unconstitutional to require a "notice of claim"
filing

as

condemnation"

a

pre-requisite
claim).

Thus,

to

"inverse

whatever

was

"appealed" from/to the County Commission in 1998
is irrelevant for the Plaintiff's claims. [That
Judge Hansen in both trials "got it wrong" in his
refusal to consider anything other than from the
"forty feet" line and upwards is not binding on
this Court. Similarly, the COUNTY should not be
heard to disingenuously ignore the effect of its
own

"highway-abutting"

Ordinance,
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preventing

access thereto. With "driveway access" thus denied
to those subdivision residents, the entirety of
the

State

Road

171

improvements

became

unconstitutionally "excessive".
The B.A.M. II
Court

[2006] decision of the Utah Supreme

remanding the case back to the District Court for

trial correctly applying Dolan
issue was

resolved,

avoided, once the threshold

meaningful

discussion

of

the two

"certiorari certified" (undersigned's terminology) issues
(i.e.

the

"administrative

remand"

and

a

theoretical

prerequisite to request a hearing, as expressly disavowed by
Utah

statute)

which

had

been

the

jurisprudential

justification for the B.A.M. II "appeal" (certiorari) and
decision.
Although the District Court's ruling in favor of the
COUNTY essentially "skips over" this issue, the Supreme
Court should nevertheless rule thereon.
V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN ITS REFUSAL TO RECEIVE PROFFERED TESTIMONY
OF PLAINTIFF'S "REBUTTAL" EXPERT WITNESS
The Dolan

decision

also makes

it

clear

that the

government has the burden of proof in establishing the
validity of the exaction:
Justice STEVENS' dissent takes us to task for
placing the burden on the city to justify the
required dedication. He is correct in arguing that
in evaluating most generally applicable zoning
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r i g h t s . H e r e , b y contrast, the city m a d e a n
a d j u d i c a t i v e decision t o condition p e t i t i o n e r ' s
a p p l i c a t i o n for a b u i l d i n g permit o n a n individual
p a r c e l . In this situation, the b u r d e n p r o p e r l y
rests on the c:i ty.
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Th e C O U N T Y h a d i 101 w i t h s t a nd i ng "con t i i IU i i lg" d i s cov e r y
requests requesting the production of documents supporting its
"defenses" to Plaintiff s claims-- failed to produce any
documentary evidence to Plaintiff Tl n is, Pi aintiff was not in
possession of that "evidence 11 and should not be expected to
have any k.:i nd of "burden" to produce such evidence.
More significantly, Plaintiff B.A.M. cannot have any kind
of burden to produce testimonial or documentary "evidence" as
to the "costs to the County", when such evidence does not
exist, has never existed, and will not exist, because the
County has no "costs" for State Road 17.1 ,
It is impossible to prove a negative, and B.A.M'. should
not be expected to even have to try. Correspondingly, the
COUNTY'S fa :i lure to produce any evidence on the "costs to the
County" speaks volumes.
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even of going forward with the evidence) has implications in
the trial court's prejudicial denial
or disbelief

not merely rejection

of the Plaintiff's offered testimony of its

expert witness, Mr Craig Smith.
Following remand of the case back to the District
Court, the COUNTY claimed that

"expert witnesses were

necessary" to adjudicate the case. Although the Plaintiff
disagreed with that "experts are needed" conclusion, both
sides retained "expert witnesses". Although both "experts"
prepared written reports which were submitted to the other
party, neither party chose to depose the other party's
"expert".
A week or so before trial the COUNTY filed a "motion in
limine", seeking essentially to disqualify the Plaintiff's
"expert witness" from testifying. Essentially, the COUNTY'S
motion was predicated upon the fact that Mr Craig Smith, an
attorney, was not an engineer and thus was unable to
formulate or render an "expert opinion" as to the compliance
with the B.A.M. Ill directive.
The COUNTY'S "disqualification" motion was argued to
Judge Toomey on May 24th

a mere two days prior to trial.

Judge Toomey ruled, on "timeliness" grounds
late filed

the motion was

against the COUNTY.

Two days later, on the first day of the bench trial,
Judge Toomey

arguably in full awareness of the "case" (ala
44
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we're looking at th«: whole r^3 iC^et o oniy 11 feet
but my determination for the evidentiary portion
is to hear i t a] 1 It can certainly, if I've heard
it all, can be easily deducted
: subtracted;
when eas, if I concluded at the end of the trial,
Oh, we really should have looked at it, then we've
got a redo on our hands I want to hear all the
evidence and then I'll determine what part of it
I'm. looking at
TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL, 26 May 2020. Page 44, lines 1322. Emphasis added.
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• -; -.ho r-nnt-ext: • * ?':'•- Motion in iinuiie"
>.,. coui" Jelled the "motion in

restrict his testiaiouy . J

Given the Court's previous "I want to hear all the
evidence" remark made during the introductory stages of the
trial (May 26th), B.A.M. was led to believe the particular
"order" of the presentation of witnesses was not going to be
a problem. Likewise, given Dolan's attribution of the
"burden" upon the government agency and the fact that Mr
Smith had always been designated as a "rebuttal witness"
(and the Court was aware of that "rebuttal" designation and
had even ruled substantively on the County's "motion in
limine" to exclude Mr Smith's testimony), B.A.M. and its
counsel were reasonably led to believe the particular order
or sequence of the witnesses would not be a problem.
Given the Court's ultimate verdict
to B.A.M.

entirely adverse

the Court's unexplained departure from "I want

to hear all the evidence" and its resultant refusal to
substantively hear Mr Smith's "rebuttal" testimony cannot be
characterized by anything less than prejudicial, which
prejudicial error should be remedied as part of this appeal.
Although Mr Smith began his testimony, after a few
minutes his testimony was cut-off by Judge Toomey, who
denied further testimony from him. Her basis for ruling was
that

the

"rebuttal

expert

witness"

(the

terminology

consistently utilized in the run-up to the bench trial) Mr
Smith should have
Plaintiff's

called

to testify

case-in-chief".
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B.A.M. Ill "burden" through the testimony of its "expert
witness", Mr Jon Nepstad. The Plaintiff B.A.M. had always
characterized
witness.

and designated Mr Smith as a "rebuttal"

Indeed,

the

COUNTY

had

utilized

that

same

descriptive terminology. RECORD, at page 711.
The Court's expectation

(requirement) that Mr Smith

should have been presented to testify "in Plaintiff's casein-chief"

misapplies

and

fails

to

understand

Dolan's

"burden" requirement:
1.

First,

the government

has

the burden of

showing constitutional compliance.
2.

Secondly, until the COUNTY'S "expert witness"

(Mr Nepstad) actually testified, there would be
absolutely

nothing

Considerable

time

to

would

have

"rebut".FOOTNOTE6
been

wasted

in

attempting to anticipate Mr Nepstad's expected
testimony, only to perhaps have that testimony to
change, thus prompting an additional "rebuttal".
Until Mr Nepstad actually testified, there was nothing
6

It is anybody's guess what "foundation" and "not in evidence"
objections which could have been raised had the "rebuttal
witness" attempted to testify in advance.
Furthermore, even though Plaintiff's counsel had been
given the "expert's written report", there was no guarantee
that his testimony would follow that report: in direct
coverage as well as other testimony about issues not fully
disclosed within his report. Considerable time would possibly
have been wasted in "rebutting" issues which perhaps would
have never been presented.
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with B.A.M. Ill, the Court should conclude that B.A.M. is
entitled to judgment in the full value of the exaction
imposed against it. The COUNTY having failed
"petition

for

rehearing"

to

identify

in the 2008
the

needed

"expansion/extension" of B.A.M. should not be heard to
presently argue for such "expansion": in jurisprudence nor
in the actual disposition of this case.
Expenses for the capital improvement of state roadways
come from statewide revenues
taxes

and

other

(state and federal roadway

taxes) , as

appropriated

Legislature. The in-kind exactions

by

the Utah

imposed not only in

disregard of those "taxation" payments, but in disregard of
the quantitative nature of those "fuel taxes" and so forth--are constitutionally "unreasonable", per Banberry.
The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for 100% of its
expenses incurred for the exaction (dedication and in-kind
improvements) required pursuant to the "highway-abutting
Ordinance": $391,000+, plus accrued interest.
The Supreme Court should direct the District Court to
enter judgment in favor of B.A.M., in the full amount of the
$391,000+, plus accrued interest thereto.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of March, 2010.

Attorney for Plaintiff
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Building permit issuance.
I uu affected b> dedication
Improvement ' *" s r j
procedures.
Appeal.
Amendments to highway plan.

i: equired,
Except as otherwise provided in Section,.
15.28.020, no building or structure shall be erec
ted, reconstructed, structurally altered 01
enlarged, and, no building permit shall be issued
therefor, on any lot or parcel of land which abuts
a major or secondary highway, as shown on the
map entitled, "Official Major and, Secondar
Highway Plan, Salt Lake Com ity,," 01 i f Lie * ith
the development services division and made part
of this chapter by reference, or other public street
which does not conform to current county width
standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel
within the right-of-way of the highway to be w id
ened or additional required street width has been,
dedicated to the county and improved. The dedication and i,i nprovements shall meet the standards for such highway or street as provided in
Section 15.28.060. (Ord. 961 § 1, (part), 1986:
prior code § 2-6-1)
15.28.020 Exceptions.
A. The maximum area required to I . _ J ,
cated shall not exceed twenty-five percent of ur
lot or parcel, which was of record on the efleaiu
date of the ordinance codified in this chapter u
the county recorder's office. In determining th<

15.28.010

amount of area required for dedication foi purposes of this exception, any highway area which
previously has been dedicated to the public
through public use shall not be included
B, Such required dedication shall not reduce
t he lot or parcel to less than, five thousand square
feet.
L Dedicai:on shall :^i ix :chaired ;-r; ::.-.se
portions i;;\j :ot occupied b\ d zvdin tn.iJa.ng
existing on me effectne date • he ^\i:;^.AC
codified in this chapter.
D. Additional improvements shall not be
i equired on a lot where paved surface, curb, gutter and sidewalk improvements in good condition exist within the present right-of-way, unless
i lse is changed from agricultural or single-family
dwelling to a commercial, industriaJ, office or
two-family dwelling or more.
E. Dedication shall not be required, for
i emodelings, additions and accessory buildings
incidental to a single-family dwelling, used as a
i esidence, existing on the lot as of the effective
date of the ordinance codified, in this chapter,
provided that no additional dwelling units are
CXeat, ::!'d,.
f ". Dedication shall not be required for additions or accessory buildings clearly incidental to
a ma in, building existing on the lot as of the
ei feet ive date of the ordinance codified in this
chapter, provided that the cumulative floor area
of all such additions and accessor*}' buildings does
not exceed two hundred square feet or twenty
percent of existing square foota*;\ whichever is
greater. (Ord. 961 § 1 (part), 1 ** : prior code §
2-6-2)
15.2 8., 0 30 D e d i ca t i o n p r o c e d u i e.
A Any person or other entity required to dedicate land in ider the provisions of this chapter
shall execute an offer todedicateanda warranty
ieed or other deed form acceptable to the county
operly executed by all parties of interest in such
erms as to be binding on the owner, his/her
. - assigns or successor in interest. The offer to
'ie. deed, and a title report shall be filed
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Wasatch Front Regional council

LONG RANGE
TRANSPORTATION
PLAN
1998-2020
Technical Report Number 36

Table V]-] summarizes the amount of revenues projected to be available in the Wasatch Front
Region over the next twenty years.
Table VI-1
STATEWIDE AND WASATCH FRONT REGION
PROJECTED HIGHWAY REVENUES
1998 - 2020
I

SOURCE

AMOUNT

|

$3,900,000,000

J

$300,000,000

J

$10,625,000,000
$1,900,000,000

||
J

Innovative Financing

$62,500,000

1

Total Statewide Revenue

$16,787,500,000

|

1

STATEWIDE REVENUE
Federal Funds
Federal Highway Trust Fund
Special Olympic Funding
State Funds
Highway User Revenue (less diversions)
General Funds And Bonding

Other Funds

Statewide Revenue Available For Wasatch Front Region
J

$8,512,500,000

LOCAL WASATCH FRONT REGION REVENUE
Federal Highway Trust Fund

1

|

$420,000,000

1

Class B&C Funds

$1,780,000,000

1

City And County General Funds

$2,300,000,000

J

$187,500,000

J

$4,687,500,000

||

Innovative Financing
Total Local Wasatch Front Region Revenue
Total Statewide And Local Wasatch Front Region Revenue

$13,200,000,000

TRANSIT SOURCES
Revenues for transit service and improvements are available from several sources including federal
funds, a local sales tax, fares, and others. Federal funds for transit capital and planning assistance
are made available through the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). These funding programs are
financed through the federal gasoline tax as well asfromgeneral fund monies. Revenues for transit
improvements were projected using the assumption that local support for transit would increase to
Salt Lake Urbanized Area Long Range Transportation Plan - Financial Plan

ATTACHMENT 2
Pacre 2 of 2 cacres

Page 98

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY

Utah 601

Cite as 196 P.3d 601 (Utah 2008)

additional land for expanded roadway. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., found in
favor of county. Developer appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 87 P.3d 710, reversed
and remanded with directions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., 128 P.3d 1161,
held that the "rough proportionality" test
governed county's exaction of portion of
developer's property. The District Court,
Third District, Salt Lake Department,
Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied developer's
claim. Developer appealed.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J.,
held that court's "rough proportionality"
analysis should have been a "rough equivalency" test that compared respective costs
of municipally required exaction and its
impact to developer and county.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error <S=>842(9)
Whether the proper analysis was applied
by a trial court is a mixed question of law
and fact.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>863
When the legal concept of a case is
easily defined and the case involves important constitutional property concerns, the
standard of review is correctness.
2008 UT 74

BAM. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company. Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic
and political subdivision of the State
of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20070137.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 24, 2008.
Background: Developer appealed denial
of license due to its objection to dedicating

3. Eminent Domain <s=*2.10(7)
"Rough proportionality" test to determine constitutionality of a municipally required exaction requires a "rough equivalence" comparison of respective costs and
impact of exaction on parties. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. Eminent Domain <S=>2.10(7)
A court engaging in analysis of the constitutionality of a municipally required exaction must determine (1) whether the nature
of the exaction and impact are related, (2)
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whether the exaction and impact are related
in extent, either by measuring cost to the
municipality of assuaging the impact, or by
measuring the value of the land to be dedicated by the developer at the time of the
exaction, and, (3) whether the costs to each
party are roughly equivalent. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.
5. Eminent Domain <£=>2.10(7)
If the costs to each party are about the
same, they are "roughly equivalent" for the
purpose of analyzing the constitutionality of a
municipally required exaction. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

tioned upon BAM. expanding the current
width of the major road bordering the proposed development (3500 South) from seventeen feet "half-width" (approximately 34 feet
in total width) to 40 feet half-width. Later,
in accordance with changes to the County's
master traffic plan, the County told B.A.M.
that it would be required to increase the
street to 53 feet half-width. This additional
exaction of 13 feet, B.A.M. alleges, represents an unconstitutional taking.
113 After appealing the County's decision
through administrative channels, B.A.M.
sued the County, seeking either to escape the
exaction or to receive just compensation for
the alleged taking. After losing in the trial
court, B.A.M. appealed to the court of appeals and then to this court.

6. Eminent Domain @=>2.10(7)
To determine constitutionality of a mu114 In a prior decision on this same case,
nicipally required exaction, trial court should this court held that the trial court should use
have carried out a "rough equivalency" anal- the "rough proportionality" analysis in Dolan
ysis by comparing respective costs of munici- v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct.
pally required exaction and its impact to 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), to determine
developer and county. U.S.C.A. Const. whether the exaction was an unconstitutional
Amend. 5.
taking. B.AM. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake
County, 2006 UT 2, 1146, 128 P.3d 1161. On
remand, the trial court again denied B AM.'s
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plain- claims. BAM. now appeals from that decitiff.
sion.
Lohra L. Miller, Donald H. Hansen, Salt
Lake City, for defendant.
ANALYSIS
[1,2] 11 5 The dispute between the parties
is whether the trial court correctly applied
WILKINS, Justice:
the "rough proportionality" analysis from
111 Appellant BAM. Development alleges Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114
that the trial court incorrectly applied the S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). Whether
"rough proportionality" analysis from Dolan the proper analysis was applied is a mixed
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. question of law and fact. In this case, be2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), in examining cause "the legal concept is easily defined"
whether an exaction required of the develop- and because the case involves important coner by Appellee Salt Lake County was an stitutional property concerns, the standard of
unconstitutional taking. We hold that the review is correctness. State v. Levin, 2006
trial court did not apply the correct analysis, UT 50, 111123-24, 144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion
and thus reverse and remand.
is most confined—and the standard of review
is nondeferential—when the legal concept is
easily defined by appellate courts or when
BACKGROUND
appellate courts erect strict fences for policy
11 2 In 1997, BAM. Development (B.A.M.) reasons.").
sought approval from Salt Lake County to
116 In Dolan, the United States Supreme
build a residential development. The County
informed B.A.M. that approval was condi- Court held that a municipally required exacAMENDED OPINION
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tion must be roughly proportionate to the
impact of the development; otherwise, the
exaction is an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Dolan,
512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309 ("We think a
term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment"). The Dolan
analysis requires a court to examine two
factors, the exaction and the development's
impact, and to determine whether the two
are in rough proportionality. In this case,
both parties effectively agree that one of
those factors—the impact of the development—is a 3.04% increase in traffic along
3500 South. The parties disagree on the
other factor, however, as well as whether the
two are roughly proportionate.1

[3] 118 Of course, the Court did not mean
rough proportionality at all. While 1 to 1 is
a proportion, so is 1 to 1000, as any fifth
grade student will be happy to tell you. Any
two numbers, measured by the same units,
form a proportion. So to be roughly proportional literally means to be roughly related,
not necessarily roughly equivalent, which is
the concept the Court seemed to be trying to
describe. The proportion of 1 to 1.01 is
roughly equivalent, while the proportion of 1
to 3 is not, for example. Unfortunately, by
using the phrase "rough proportionality," the
Court has engendered vast confusion about
just what the municipalities and courts are
expected to evaluate when extracting action
or value from a land owner trying to improve
real property. In this instance, rather than
adopting the name chosen by the United
11 7 A closer examination of Dolan clarifies States Supreme Court, we will use the more
how to determine whether the two factors workable description of rough equivalence,
are roughly proportionate. In Dolan, the on the assumption that it represents what
Court looked first to how the states had the Dolan Court actually meant.
119 After deciding on what to call the
approached the issue of exactions as unconstitutional takings. See id. at 389-91, 114 analysis, the Court explained what it enS.Ct. 2309. After examining various ap- tailed: In order for an exaction to be constiproaches, the Court stated that the "reason- tutional, a municipality must make some de' able relationship" test, then being used in termination "that the required dedication is
Utah2 and the majority of other states, was related both in nature and extent to the
"closer to the federal constitutional norm" impact of the proposed development." Id.
than the other tests. Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. (emphases added). The Dolan analysis thus
2309. The Court explained, however, that it has two aspects: first, the exaction and imwould not "adopt it as such, partly because pact must be related in nature; second, they
the term 'reasonable relationship' seems con- must be related in extent.
fusingly similar to the term 'rational basis'
[4] 1110 A court engaging in a Dolan
wliich describes the minimal level of scrutiny analysis must first determine, therefore,
under the Equal Protection Clause of the whether the nature of the exaction and imFourteenth Amendment." Id. Instead, the pact are related. One method that other
Court held, "[w]e think a term such as 'rough courts have adopted to determine this relaproportionality' best encapsulates what we tionship is to look at the exaction and impact
hold to be the requirement of the Fifth in terms of a solution and a problem, respecAmendment." Id.
tively.3 We agree that the impact is the
1. For example, the County argues that the exaction i;> roughly piopoitionate to the impact because the exaction lepresents, alternatively,
1.89% of the total land of the development,
2.22% of the developers' available lots, 1.38% of
the total area of the road after widening, or
2.01% of the total expanded area of the road.
B.A.M., on the other hand, argues that the exaction is giossly dispioportionate to the impact
because the exaction results, alternatively, in a
300% increase in the road's carrying capacity, a
300% increase m the road width, or a payment of
100% of the toad improvement costs.

2.

See, e.g., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City,
631 P.2d 899, 902-05 (Utah 1981).

3.

See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County, 127
Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742 (1995) (stating
that an exaction must be "reasonably calculated
to prevent, or compensate for, adverse public
impacts of the proposed development" (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Burton
v. Clark County, 91 Wash.App. 505, 958 P.2d 343,
354 (1998) ("[T]he government must show that
its proposed solution to the identified public
problem is 'roughly proportional' to that part of
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problem, or the burden that the community
will bear because of the development. The
exaction should address the problem. If it
does, then the nature component has been
satisfied.
Ull The second component of the Dotan
analysis is whether the exaction and impact
are related in extent This requirement implies that both the exaction and the impact
should be measured in the same manner, or
using the same standard. The most appropriate measure is cost—specifically, the cost
of the exaction and the impact to the developer and the municipality, respectively. The
impact of the development can be measured
as the cost to the municipality of assuaging
the impact Likewise, the exaction can be
measured as the value of the land to be
dedicated by the developer at the time of the
exaction, along with any other costs required
by the exaction. Our trial courts are very
adept at figuring out costs in similar situations, and are more than capable of adjudging the cost of each factor in this context

equivalent The trial court, despite a valiant
effort to divine the application of Dolan's
"rough proportionality" test, did not correctly apply the Dolan analysis because it failed
to compare respective costs of the exaction
and impact to the parties.
CONCLUSION
114 The Dolan analysis, properly applied,
asks whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is roughly
equal to the cost being extracted to offset it.
We hold that the trial court applied the
Dolan analysis incorrectly, and we reverse
and remand the trial court's decision for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1 15 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate
Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice
PARRISH, and Judge McHUGH concur in
Justice WILKINS' opinion,

116 Justice NEHRING does not
participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge
[5] H 12 After determining the cost to
CAROLYN B. McHUGH sat
each party, the final step of the extent component of the Dolan analysis is simple: The
trial court must determine whether the costs
( O f « Y NUMBtR SYSTEM
to each party are roughly equivalent4 Because each factor is measured the same way,
in dollars, this calculation should be very
simple. If the two sums are about the same,
they are roughly equivalent for this purpose.

a>

[6] H 13 With this framework in mind,
applying the Dolan analysis becomes a relatively straightforward task. First, the trial
court must determine whether the exaction
and impact are related in nature—or whether the solution (the exaction) directly addresses the specific problem (the impact).
Second, the trial court must determine what
the cost of dealing with the impact would be
to the County, absent any exaction; what the
cost of the exaction would be to the developer; and whether the two costs are roughly
the problem that is created or exacerbated by the
landowner's development.").
4.

As the Court noted in Dolan, exact equality
between the factors is unnecessary. Dolan v.
CuyofTtgard. 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309,
129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) ("No precise matheinati-

cal calculation is required . . . . " ) ; see also Banberry, 631 P.2d at 904 ("Precise mathematical
equality 'is neither feasible nor constitutionally
vital.' " (quoting Airwick Indus., Inc. v. Carls tacit
Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18, 26
(1970))).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

CASE NO. 980908157
DATE: JULY 8, 2010

Defendant.

This action came before the Court for a bench trial on May 26, 27, and 28, 2010
pursuant to an order of remand from the Utah Supreme Court. The issue on remand is
"whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is roughly equal
to the cost being extracted to offset it." B.A.M. Devel., LLC. v. Salt Lake County, 2008
UT 74, fi 14 ("B.A.M. II"). The Plaintiff, B.A.M. Development, LLC ("B.A.M."), was
represented by counsel Stephen Homer; the Defendant, Salt Lake County ("the
County"), was represented by Donald Hansen, Thomas Christensen, and Melanie
Mitchell.
Background
B A.M. sought the County's approval to build a residential development. The

1
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County conditioned its approval on B.A.M. expanding the existing width of 3500 South,
a major road bordering the proposed development

Later, the County informed B.A.M.

that it would be required to increase the street width even more. This additional
exaction, which is a 13-foot wide strip running the length of one side of the property as it
adjoins 3500 South, was the subject of B.A.M.'s appeal in which it contended that the
exaction was an unconstitutional taking, and the decision of this a p p e a l - B A M . //-was
the remand that prompted the most recent trial in this case. The history of the case and
the Utah Supreme Court's explanations and directives bear recounting.
The Court action began when B.A.M. sued the County, asking either to avoid the
exaction or to receive just compensation for the alleged taking. The Plaintiff's
Complaint alleged causes of action for Unreasonable and Excessive Development
Exactions; Uncompensated Taking of Private Property for Public Use; Violation of Due
Process; Denial of Equal Protection Under the Law; Denial of Uniform Operation of
Laws; Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and Non-Compliance with Statutory
Requirements. Judgement for Defendant was entered July 30, 2001, with the Court
finding no cause of action on any claim.
After losing at trial, B.A.M. appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, and then to
the Utah Supreme Court, ultimately securing a remand and a directive to this Court to
use the "rough proportionality" analysis set forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994) to determine whether the exaction was an unconstitutional taking. Accordingly,
this Court conducted another trial,1 at the conclusion of which it determined that all of

'The first two trials in this matter were conducted by Judge Timothy Hansen.
2
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the Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. This gave rise to another
appeal, and as noted above, the B.A.M. II appellate decision produced the remand that
brought the matter to trial in May 2010.
In B.A.M. II, the Supreme Court considered whether, in the second trial, this
Court correctly applied the rough proportionality analysis established by the Dolan case,
and determined that it had not. The rough proportionality analysis is important because
if the required exaction is not roughly proportionate to the impact of the development,
the exaction is an unconstitutional taking. In prior proceedings, the parties agreed that
the impact of the development is a 3.04% increase in traffic on 3500 South, but this is
an apples to oranges comparison against the 13-foot exaction.
The B.A.M. II decision offered some instruction for determining whether the
exaction and the development's impact are roughly proportionate, explaining that
"rough proportionality" is not what the United States Supreme Court actually meant, but
"rough equivalence." This entails determining whether the required exaction is "related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." BAM II, U 9.
Accordingly, the court must first determine whether the nature of the exaction and its
impact-the burden the community will bear because of the development-are related.2
Second, the Court must determine whether the exaction and impact are related in
extent. The Supreme Court noted that this
implies that both the exaction and the impact should be measured in the same
manner, or using the same standard. The most appropriate measure is
cost-specifically, the cost of the exaction and the impact to the developer and
2

The parties have stipulated that the nature component of the equation has been

met.
3
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the municipality, respectively. The impact of the development can be measured
as the cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact. Likewise, the exaction
can be measured as the value of the land to be dedicated by the developer at
the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the exaction.
Id. fl 11. Finally, "[t]he trial court must determine whether the costs to each party are
roughly equivalent." Id. fl 12. The Supreme Court forecast that this would be simple,
and if the sums are about the same, then they are roughly equivalent. Precision is not
required.
This Court's assignment, then, was to "determine what the cost of dealing with
the impact would be to the County, absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction
would be to the developer; and whether the two costs are roughly equivalent." Id. fl 13.
In other words, "[t]he Dolan analysis, properly applied, asks whether the imposition on
the community of a proposed development is roughly equal to the cost being extracted
to offset it." Id. fl 14. The remand did not include a directive to consider B.A.M.'s
claims for equal protection, uniform operation of law, or equitable estoppel.
As indicated, the trial spanned three days; counsel subsequently submitted
closing arguments in writing. The Court has read and considered these, and has
reviewed the evidence from both previous trials, as well as the rest of the file, and the
appellate court decisions and other authority cited by counsel. Pursuant to the Utah
Supreme Court's directive in B.AM. //, the Court has evaluated B.A.M.'s claim using the
rough equivalent standard, and makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 30, 1997, B.A.M. submitted to the County an application and proposed
4
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plat for the development of a proposed subdivision known as Westridge
Meadows ("the Subdivision"), and located at approximately 7700 West and 3500
South in unincorporated Salt Lake County.
2.

At the times relevant to this action, 3500 South was owned by the State of Utah
and managed by the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). The
ownership of public roads occasionally changes, however, as the result of a
legislative "jurisdictional transfer" or by operation of law through annexation and
incorporation of municipalities.

3.

The proposed plat for the Subdivision included a 40-foot highway dedication
along 3500 South, which is on the north boundary of B.A.M.'s property.

4.

Salt Lake County's engineering and development staff approved B.A.M.'s
proposed subdivision on August 26, 1997, subject to compliance with County
road standards, including a 40-foot highway right-of-way dedication of land
where the subdivision parcel abuts 3500 South.

5.

On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission preliminarily approved
B.A.M.'s amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication along 3500
South.

6.

On July 2, 1998, B.A.M. appealed the 53-foot right-of-way requirement to the
Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners.

7.

The Board of County Commissioners denied B.A.M.'s appeal on July 15, 1998.

8.

On June 23, 1999, the County planning commission approved B.A.M.'s
amended subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53foot dedication.
5
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9.

The Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of the plat on August
18, 1999, and the plat was recorded in the Recorder's Office on August 27,
1999.

10.

B A M . constructed the subdivision.

11.

In April 1998, County transportation engineer Andrea Pullos analyzed historical
and projected traffic volumes on 2500 South in the "traffic link" between the
intersecting cross streets 7200 West and 8000 West, an area in which the
Subdivision lies.

12.

Ms. Pullos's analysis used historical traffic data compiled by UDOT that showed
increasing traffic volume on 3500 South between the traffic link. She compared
the anticipated traffic volume increase that would be created by the Subdivision
with the amount of B.A.M.'s land that the exaction would require B.A.M. to
dedicate for future highway right-of-way.

13.

Ms. Pullos concluded that the two were roughly proportionate.

14.

In the period during which the Subdivision application was pending, local growth
and development in this area was expected to continue, generating increased
traffic volume on 3500 South.

15.

WFCR anticipates responding to this increased growth by widening existing
roads, and also widening the traffic link. The cost of the project in 1998 dollar
values is $6,748,700.

16.

The road-widening projects will likely be financed by a combination of
government road construction funding sources, including federal highway funds
and additional State, County, and/or municipal funds.

6
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17.

Comparing the total expected increase in traffic by the year 2020 with the portion
of the vehicle trips attributable to the Subdivision, the portion of the $6,748,700
total cost that is directly attributable to the Subdivision is 5%, or $337,500.00.

18.

This sum reflects the cost to the public of responding to the increased traffic
likely to be caused by the Subdivision.

19

B.A.M.'s costs resulting from the 13-foot exaction are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

land lost from the decrease in lot sizes for 9 lots:
additional pavement costs
power pole relocation costs
fees for re-engineering
excavation costs
tree removal costs
Total:

20

$10,407.29
$10,140.00
$23,250.00
$12,450.00
$ 5,400.00
$11,175.00
$83,997.29

Although B.A.M. has attempted to challenge the entire highway right-of-way
dedication and to include in the exaction the incidental development costs of
installing curb and gutter, fencing, storm and sewer lines, the only issue it
appealed to the County Board of Commissioners was the requirement of a 53foot dedication rather than a 40-foot dedication. Accordingly, the only issue
before this Court was the additional 13-feet exacted by the County.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The scope of this remand was to determine whether the additional 13-foot

exaction of land required by the County was an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation. The impact cost and the exaction cost were related
in nature. The Court has employed a rough equivalency analysis, comparing the
monetary cost of the relevant government-imposed exaction to B.A.M.-$83,997.29-with
the government's monetary cost-$337,500.00-and determined that because the cost to
7
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the community is significantly higher than the cost to B.A.M. of the exaction, there has
been no taking.
In reaching these conclusions, the Court has taken into account B.A.M.'s
argument that paragraph 13 of the B.A.M. //decision confined this Court to considering
only the cost to the County. The County points to paragraphs 10 and 14, and the Utah
Supreme Court's elimination of footnote 5 in the decision that preceded B.A.M. /, in
support of its contention that what the Court should examine is the cost to the
community. Based upon the arguments set forth in the County's Closing Argumentjhe
Court concludes that this approach is more persuasive.
ORDER
The County is to submit a proposed form of judgment at an appropriate time
pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this T d a v of

JuX^

, 2010.

KATE A, TOO
DISTRICT CO
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